Context-switching gone wrong

Written on March 13, 2021

I remember while this bug wasn’t that hard to fix (or find), it still had some “fantastic” potential to it. Because, when it appeared, at first nothing made sense anymore…

When programming, it happens occasionally that you end up with a dead-end: A branch in the code that you determine will never be taken by the CPU with absolute certainty. However, due to limitations in the language or the structure of your algorithm you can’t really avoid to account for it in the program.

An example can be a match statement like this one:

let mut ops = Vec::with_capacity(nop);
for _i in 0..nop {
    let op = orng.gen();
    match op % 2 {
        0 => ops.push(Operation::WriteOperation(OpWr::Pop)),
        1 => ops.push(Operation::WriteOperation(OpWr::Push(orng.gen()))),
        _ => unreachable!("Can only have 0 or 1"),

Since we end up doing modulo two on our op variable, the only values we ever expect to see is 0 or 1 in that match statement. However, the match statement in rust needs to be exhaustive and in some cases the rust compiler isn’t able to determine that only two scenarios are valid and so it still wants us to provide a wild-card pattern (using _), which provides an execution path for every number that is not 0 or 1. Because we determine this code-path can never be executed we end up putting an unreachable! statement there, which would just abort the program. That’s perfectly fine because it’s obvious to see that we never go there.

Note aside, the current rust compiler does in-fact eliminate the unreachable branch in release mode (but not in debug mode). Another way to write it is to replace the 1 with a _ in the match statement but this can lead to “hard-to-find bugs” if we change the expression we’re matching on later.

Another (slightly weaker) form of such paths are “trivial” pre-conditions in the form of asserts. For example, here is such a pre-condition in C:

void mutex_obj_hold(kmutex_t *lock)
    struct kmutexobj *mo = (struct kmutexobj *)lock;

    KASSERTMSG(mo->mo_magic == MUTEX_OBJ_MAGIC,
        "%s: lock %p: mo->mo_magic (%#x) != MUTEX_OBJ_MAGIC (%#x)",
         __func__, mo, mo->mo_magic, MUTEX_OBJ_MAGIC);


Essentially, the KASSERTMSG is saying that in order to call mutex_obj_hold the argument provided must be of type kmutexobj, which is validated in C by checking that the member mo_magic is set to the constant MUTEX_OBJ_MAGIC. This is a way to add some type robustness for a “loosely typed” language such as C. While this pre-condition can certainly be wrong, in practice this is rarely expected to happen. The only time this supposedly can fail is if someone just wrote some locking code and invoked this function with a wrong argument (aka a different type) or forgot to initialize the lock1.

Branching into the unreachable

As you can probably guess, the manifestation of the bug in this post was that the execution of a program would suddenly end up in such code-paths by taking these “impossible” branches. Which meant for the first example, that it could suddenly fail with

thread 'main' panicked at 'internal error: entered unreachable code: Can only be 0 or 1', src/

And, because that wasn’t weird enough, the bug also wasn’t deterministic: Most of the time the program would work “just fine”, but every so often the code would abort due to some random assert, panic, or unreachable! statement. Upon inspection they always turned out to be unlikely or impossible things which now suddenly happened at an alarming rate.

To understand this a bit better, we have to refresh some knowledge about CPU assembly language (we use x86) to see what’s really going on under the hood. It’s important to understand that our match and KASSERT example will eventually be rewritten using just a bunch of if statements by the compiler:

if op % 2 == 0 {
else if op % 2 == 1 {
else {
    unreachable!("Can only have 0 or 1");

Afterwards, the code is further simplified into comparisons (cmp) and branch instructions (jmp, jne etc.) when converted to x86 assembly. To explain, we show the assembly code for the first if statement, if op % 2 == 0:

and     rax, 1
cmp     rax, 0
jne     .LBB126_3

The first instruction does a bitwise and with op (in rax) and the constant 1 (calculates op % 2 by taking the first bit of op and stores this in rax), then it compares the rax to 0 using cmp, and finally if rax contained something not 0, it will jump to another location (e.g., to the label .LBB126_3). However, if it was 0 it will continue with the next instruction after jne.

One thing that’s important to understand here is that there is an implicit dependency between the result of cmp and jne that is not directly visible: Since jne needs to jump (or not) based on the result of the previous cmp instruction, it needs to access its result somehow. On x86, the CPU has a special register called RFLAGS for this purpose. What happens is that the cmp instruction will subtract the second operand (0) from the first operand (rax) and then set flags in RFLAGS based on the result of the subtraction. For example, the Zero Flag (which is the one important for jne), is set to 1 if the subtraction performed by cmp results in zero. This means jne just needs to inspect the Zero Flag in RFLAGS: if it is set it won’t jump because the compared values were equal, but if it remained unset it will jump to the specified location.

Locating the issue

So what went wrong with our code? Why would the CPU suddenly take those odd branches that led nowhere? Assuming our branch logic in the CPU wasn’t broken, surely the bug must be in the software somewhere?

As always there were a couple of options where this bug could be located: For example, since we wrote our own ELF parsing and loading library, if something was messed up in there about how instructions get loaded or relocated it could definitely become a problem. This seemed unlikely though since the bug only affected branches and also wasn’t deterministic.

What really helped was when I eventually figured out that this bug only happened on CPU cores were the OS received interrupts during execution. That limited the scope of the bug to anything that would happen in the interrupt handler. To isolate further, I downsized the interrupt handler by removing all program logic in it (aside from restoring the context). When afterwards the bug was still present, I knew it must be in the context restore logic.

To explain this a bit more: The bread and butter of an operating system is to give an illusion to a program that it is running without any interruption on a CPU. In reality tough, an OS will context-switch many times per second to execute many different programs concurrently. One cause for a context switch can be interrupts: For example from a device, to notify when a packet is ready, or a timer to tell us that it might be time to run some other program now. To hold up the illusion, OS and hardware ideally must capture the exact state of the CPU when the interruption happens and restore back that exact state to resume execution of a program later.

There are two predominant ways to resume execution in user-space from a kernel on modern x86: sysret to return after a program made a syscall, and iretq to return after an interrupt. Both need to restore the CPU context which can include some or all general-purpose registers, the SIMD and floating point state, as well as the aforementioned RFLAGS register. Context-switching usually can be executed only through a series of assembly statements.

Here is a code-snippet that stores the CPU state when an interrupt happens (it misses a register, can you spot it?). A memory region, accessed through %rax, is used to move the CPU register contents to a process-specific save area.

// Interrupt execution starts here...

// Save original %rax temporarily on the stack 
// because we will overwrite it to hold a reference to save area
pushq %rax

// First, get the pointer to the register save area
rdgsbase %rax
movq 0x8(%rax), %rax

// Save CPU general-purpose register context
// We don't save %rax yet since we used it to
// reference the save area location
movq %rbx,  1*8(%rax)
movq %rcx,  2*8(%rax)
movq %rdx,  3*8(%rax)
movq %rsi,  4*8(%rax)
movq %rdi,  5*8(%rax)
movq %rbp,  6*8(%rax)
// We don't save %rsp yet since it is overridden by CPU on irq entry
movq %r8,   8*8(%rax)
movq %r9,   9*8(%rax)
movq %r10, 10*8(%rax)
movq %r11, 11*8(%rax)
movq %r12, 12*8(%rax)
movq %r13, 13*8(%rax)
movq %r14, 14*8(%rax)
movq %r15, 15*8(%rax)

// Save original rax, which we pushed on the stack previously
popq %r15
movq %r15, 0*8(%rax)

// Save %rsp of interrupted process
movq 5*8(%rsp), %r15
movq %r15, 7*8(%rax)

// Save RIP were we were at before we got interrupted
// This is at rsp+16 (put there by the hardware):
movq 2*8(%rsp), %r15
movq %r15, 16*8(%rax)

// Saves the fs register
rdfsbase %r15
movq %r15, 19*8(%rax)

// Save vector registers
fxsave 24*8(%rax)

// Move on to high-level language function
callq handle_generic_exception

And here is the “opposite” code-snippet that restores the CPU context again (from the save area, now in %rdi) and returns to the interrupted program using iretq (this example doesn’t miss anything and is correct):

// Restore fs and gs registers
movq 19*8(%rdi), %rsi
wrfsbase %rsi

// Restore SIMD/vector registers
fxrstor 24*8(%rdi)

// Restore general-purpose CPU registers
movq  0*8(%rdi), %rax
movq  1*8(%rdi), %rbx
movq  2*8(%rdi), %rcx
movq  3*8(%rdi), %rdx
movq  4*8(%rdi), %rsi
// %rdi: Restored last (see below) to preserve `save_area`
movq  6*8(%rdi), %rbp
// %rsp: Restored through `iretq` (see below)
movq  8*8(%rdi), %r8
movq  9*8(%rdi), %r9
movq 10*8(%rdi), %r10
movq 11*8(%rdi), %r11
movq 12*8(%rdi), %r12
movq 13*8(%rdi), %r13
movq 14*8(%rdi), %r14
movq 15*8(%rdi), %r15

// Stack segment register
pushq 18*8(%rdi)
// %rsp stack register
pushq 7*8(%rdi)
// RFLAGS register
pushq 17*8(%rdi)
// Code segment register
pushq 19*8(%rdi)

// Instruction pointer
pushq 16*8(%rdi)

// Restore `rdi` register last, since it was used to reach `save_area`
movq 5*8(%rdi), %rdi

// And back we go:

The bug in this case was that we simply forgot to ever store RFLAGS to the save area in the first snippet. This meant that every time we returned from an interrupt it would use an outdated RFLAGS (the one which remained from the last time the process did a system call).

Going back to our branch example from earlier: Imagine an interrupt happens after the CPU already executed cmp but just before it wanted to start executing jne. Instead of resuming execution at jne with the up-to-date RFLAGS, now we resume with an outdated RFLAGS value that may or may not correspond to what cmp computed one instruction earlier. Without restoring RFLAGS properly, our branching became a seemingly random affair – depending on whether interrupts would happen or not and when :).

  1. Another way would be through memory corruption, but that’s not what was happening with this bug.